Sunday, January 16, 2011

The German Question, Part Seventy

"Kaiser Wilhelm & World War I" Part One/E "Europe Moves Toward War"

"The Match Touches The Powder Keg" (Part Two-"The War Begins")

There were many meetings, attempts at mediation and diplomatic communications between the various nations during the time after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the beginning of the war. The whole process was very complex, and most of these matters go beyond the scope of these articles. It will be difficult enough to keep this highly complicated situation as simple as possible here. Since this series is about Germany, the point of view of the German leaders, both civilian and military, is the concern here, and the German military strategy had much to do with the outbreak of what came to be called "The Great War." That basic strategy bears repeating: mobilize quickly, keep minimal forces along the border with Russia to hold off any Russian attacks, first deploy the vast bulk of the German army against France, attack and defeat France and then turn forces against slow to mobilize Russia. So the German strategy, with its reliance on such precise timing (often seen as "characteristically German"), became a major player in the road to war. This didn't make the Germans "wrong," as it was their perception of what they needed to do to survive a war against major enemies on their eastern and western borders. Once Bismarck's policy of keeping the Russians and French (and somewhat, the British) apart was lost, German military strategists could do no more than draw up plans on how to survive a two-front war.*

Some historians have argued that the German upper classes, fearful of the rising workers' movement and its electoral successes for seats in the Reichstag (the German parliament), desired war to unite the country, and slow down the advances made by workers. I'm not really sold on this point of view, but there may be some limited truth to it. It was certainly more true in Russia, where Tsar Nicholas II and the three hundred year old Romanov dynasty faced numerous problems, including pressures about workers' rights. While initially apprehensive about war with Germany, as a major Russian military overhaul was incomplete,** Russian military leaders came to believe the Russian army could, especially with French forces (and deploying British forces) attacking Germany's western frontier, roll over the German army and bring any war to a quick, decisive conclusion. This miscalculation of Russian strength by Russian military leaders also made war more possible. And, as noted in the first part of this segment, Austro-Hungarian leaders wanted to destroy the Black Hand and other Serbian nationalist organizations and seriously limit Serbia's expansionist dreams, thus thwarting any immediate threat of South Slav unity and the threat such unity posed for Austria-Hungary. Emboldened by the open-ended backing of Germany, this hardly restrained Austria-Hungary on wanting to go to war with Serbia.

Austria-Hungary presented an ultimatum with a 48 hour deadline to Serbia, with serious implications for Serbia's respect from others, and thus its own self respect, and it was essentially a guarantee of war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.*** Germany told Austria-Hungary it backed the ultimatum. Behind the scenes, however, German leaders had decided to act as if they knew nothing of the details of the ultimatum, and the entire German government, including Kaiser Wilhelm, went on vacation as a sort of cover. The idea was, once Serbia rejected the ultimatum and Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia, Germany would plead no knowledge of the matter and would negotiate with the other major powers about the whole thing being between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and this then would keep the war localized and small, with Serbia undoubtedly defeated and Germany's main ally, Austria-Hungary, bolstered in international eyes as being decisive.

At that moment in time, Serbia could not get backing from its foremost ally, Russia, and the Russians advised Serbia's leaders to accept the ultimatum, even the provisions that would have violated Serbian sovereignty. Not long afterward, however, Russian leaders, discouraged by Austria-Hungary's refusal to grant Russia's request for an extension of the deadline for Serbia, decided to take a stronger stance, with the hopes of getting Austria-Hungary to at least begin to back down from the overt threat to Serbia. When this didn't happen, in an effort to put teeth into the Russian stance, Nicholas ordered a partial mobilization of his military "specifically" against Austria-Hungary to begin in a few days. Serbia accepted the ultimatum, except for the part cited in "Note 3," below. European diplomats encouraged Germany to tell Austria-Hungary to agree to the Serbian acceptance, but no such encouragement was given by Kaiser Wilhelm. Serbia, now expecting an attack by Austria-Hungary, mobilized. Austria-Hungary mobilized forces along the border with Serbia in preparation for its (already planned) attack on that country. The system of alliances was now very much in play. "If" Russia declared war on, or attacked, Austria-Hungary, Germany was obligated to declare war on Russia. (Remember, with the German strategy, German leaders felt they had to attack and defeat France BEFORE Russian mobilization had gathered full steam and posed a major threat to Germany's eastern frontier. Thus any Russian announcement of mobilization would force Germany's hand.) With France and Britain allied in ways to one another and to Russia, this would bring them into the war, and indeed, France cancelled all leaves for its military personnel.

Now, just before Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia, Kaiser Wilhelm began to think matters over. He saw the Serbian acceptance of most of the ultimatum as positive, stating that negotiations could work out the parts of the ultimatum not accepted by Serbia. He saw Serbia as humiliated and he proposed making the humiliation even worse by having Austro-Hungarian troops stationed in the Serb capital of Belgrade until all matters were resolved. Wilhelm decided to influence Austria-Hungary against attacking Serbia. The German leaders, including the military, were furious with Wilhelm; so furious, that in communications with their ambassador in Vienna, they deliberately left out any reference to the Kaiser's desire for Austria-Hungary to rescind military plans against Serbia. On July 28th Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.

To keep this brief, all of the major powers' system of alliances made the dominoes fall, and Germany's military strategy prompted her response. On July 29, in support of Serbia, the Tsar ordered Russian general mobilization. Germany demanded that the Tsar rescind the order, but Russian mobilization continued, prompting German mobilization. Germany declared war on Russia on August 1. The French ordered mobilization. With France obviously prepared to honor their alliance with Russia, Germany declared war on France on August 3. Britain declared war on Germany on August 4. Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia on August 6. The "Great War" had started. (Italy, Belgium and the Ottoman Empire will be covered in the next segment.)

* Each nation had its own perception of self interest and I'm not making moral judgments here about right or wrong. France needed Russia as an ally in any war to tie down German forces on Germany's eastern border; thus helping to keep France from facing the full brunt of German military power. France needed Britain to help bolster the forces opposing Germany in western Europe. Britain's role in these alliances was perhaps less important as an individual country, as without France, if for some reason Britain went to war with Germany, where would their armies fight? Naval actions were possible and colonial military operations, but in Europe itself, there was no common area. The only major European country that benefited from an alliance with Britain against Germany was France, where British troops could cross the Channel into France and then move to the German border. The strong ties between the British and German monarchies (and other nobility) could have benefited Germany by keeping Britain neutral, but Kaiser Wilhelm's policies did anything but encourage British-German cooperation. Austria-Hungary's desire to crush Serbian nationalist groups and Serbia's expansionist notions was in its interest. More examples could be cited, but I'm sure you get the idea.

** On the other hand, German military leaders were more inclined to war with Russia, simply because the Russian military build up was incomplete in 1914; thus they saw a weaker Russia at that moment. Another strike at any peaceful solution.

*** One of the provisions required Serbia to permit Austro-Hungarian authorities to operate inside Serbia to investigate Serbian nationalist groups and connections of Serbian nationals and officials with the assassination of the Archduke. Just imagine what would happen if another country, even an ally of the United States, demanded (by ultimatum) permission of the US government to have their own officials operate within American borders to seek out anyone associated with some similar incident. That's one thing that would undoubtedly unite many people along the American political spectrum.

WORD HISTORY:
Chancellor-This word's German form, "Kanzler," is used in Germany and Austria as the title for the leading minister of government, and it is equivalent to what some countries, most notably Britain, call the "Prime Minister" (also called the "Premier" in some countries). In Switzerland, "Kanzler" is also used in government (among the majority German-speaking population, and the similar French and Italian words are used among those respective parts of the population), but the position there is not for the leading minister of government, but rather for the head of a federal council. In the United States, it is more common to find the term used in reference to the head of some universities. The word, then as "canceler," came into use in England prior to the Norman Invasion (which occurred in late 1066 A.D.) as a term for the king's secretary (ah, not the kind with a typewriter or computer), who attended to legal matters. Later, probably under the influence of the Norman-French dialect brought to England, it was spelled "chaunceler." Most sources show no history for the word further back than Latin, although one source notes "kar" as the Indo-European source (I'm not sold on this theory). It does go back to Late Latin "cancellarius," which meant "a type of secretary or official who sat behind a latticework barrier in Roman government." The key here is "lattice" or "latticework," as this was the original meaning in Latin. By the way, it is closely related to "cancel," which originally meant "to put lines (like latticework) through some written matter to 'cancel' it out." See how words and their meanings come about. Who would think that a word meaning "lattice" would have anything to do with a position in government AND a word to remove another word or phrase from a text?

Just a note: The English position of "canceler," as mentioned above, having to do with legal matters, and dating to around 1000 A.D., is still around! It eventually became "Chancellor" and then "Lord Chancellor," and the position is still involved in legal affairs, essentially being the head of the courts.

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1 Comments:

Blogger Seth said...

New here. Interesting like your word histories.

10:33 AM  

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